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Introduction
Few other global environmental issues have witnessed a larger proliferation 
of new governance initiatives than climate change. Thousands of states, 
cities, regions, companies, and civil society groups collaborate around cli-
mate action. What some have described as a “Cambrian explosion” of gov-
ernance initiatives (Keohane and Victor 2011, 12) has shifted the center of 
gravity in global climate governance away from the multilateral state-led 
response under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) toward a polycentric structure (Jordan et al. 2015). This 
diffusion of authority between public and private institutions poses impor-
tant accountability challenges for the global climate governance system 
(Widerberg and Pattberg 2017). Hybrid cooperative initiatives, where pub-
lic and private actors collaborate on climate action, are particularly inter-
esting. They render traditional conceptualizations of accountability that 
requires a division of organizations into public or private increasingly dif-
ficult to work with (Bäckstrand 2008; chapter 1, in this volume). Consider, 
for example, the Portfolio Decarbonization Coalition (PDC), a multistake-
holder initiative targeting asset managers and holders to decarbonize their 
portfolios. The initiative is run by the United Nations Environmental Pro-
gramme (UNEP), together with a Swedish pension fund (AP4), a European 
asset manager (Amundi), and partnering with an international nongovern-
mental organization (CDP). In a hybrid constellation such as the PDC that 
brings public and private actors together, who is ultimately responsible for 
making sure that the organizations involved live up to their commitments? 
By what standards should they be held accountable and what sanctions are 
available if the partners choose not to comply with the rules?
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This chapter examines accountability in hybrid climate governance ini-
tiatives. It zooms in on what Kramarz and Park call second-tier account-
ability, at the level of execution of interventions (see chapter 1, in this 
volume). This chapter discusses processes and standards that initiatives use 
to measure and evaluate progress; whether sanctions are available to punish 
noncompliance; and discernable impacts from the initiatives. The chapter 
presents evidence from four case studies of hybrid cooperative initiatives, 
based on data from the CONNECT project1.
The next section presents a brief introduction to cooperative initiatives 
in global climate governance and their relation to what Kramarz and Park 
call the the accountability trap (see chapter 1, in this volume). Subsequently, 
the case study selection is presented as well as short introductions to each 
case. Next, the chapter presents the analysis of the processes, standards, and 
sanctions of accountability in the case studies. Finally, the impacts of the 
initiatives are discussed, and the concluding section summarizes the find-
ings and outlines priorities for future research.
The Rise of Cooperative Initiatives in Climate Governance:  
An “Accountability Trap”
Cooperative initiatives, social innovations, climate clubs, and experiments are 
among the multiple terms used to describe multistakeholder initiatives 
where public and private stakeholders collaborate to solve climate-related 
problems (Widerberg and Stripple 2016). In this chapter, the term coopera-
tive initiatives refers to transnational hybrid initiatives, defined as “institu-
tionalized transboundary interactions between public and private actors, 
which aim at the provision of collective goods.” (Schäferhoff, Campe, and 
Kaan 2009, 455; see also chapter 1, in this volume). Cooperative initiatives 
are characterized by transnationality (involving crossborder interactions 
and nonstate relations); public policy objectives (as opposed to public bads 
or exclusively private goods); and a network structure (coordination by par-
ticipating actors rather than coordination by a central hierarchy), where 
participation is voluntary (Pattberg and Widerberg 2016).
Cooperative initiatives have moved from the fringes into the center of 
global climate politics. Alternative approaches to the multilateral efforts, 
including cooperative initiatives, have increasingly been discussed after 
the failure of the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC 
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in Copenhagen, (Falkner, Stephan, and Vogler 2010; Victor 2011). In the 
run-up to COP 21 held in Paris in 2015, cooperative initiatives gained 
increasing attention from the formal climate regime, partly due to the work 
of the Second Workstream of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban 
Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP2) to the UNFCCC, which was estab-
lished in 2011 and tasked with finding ways to enhance pre-2020 climate 
action. ADP2’s challenge was to close the so-called “ambition gap” which 
had emerged between the pledges made by parties to the UNFCCC and the 
decarbonization pathway needed to reach the global target of stabilizing 
global warming to 2°C. Under the supervision and mandate of ADP2, the 
UNFCCC Secretariat provided two technical reports exploring the poten-
tials in cooperative initiatives and set up a simple database on the UNFCCC 
homepage, listing a selection of initiatives (Widerberg and Stripple 2016). 
Several observers hoped that such climate actions by nonparty stakehold-
ers, including cooperative initiatives, could help wedge the ambition gap 
(UNEP 2015; Blok et al. 2012).
The outcomes of the COP 21 provided unprecedented recognition of 
nonparty stakeholders and cooperative initiatives in delivering climate 
action, taking several decisions to increase their capacity (Hale 2016). 
Governments decided inter alia that two high-level champions would be 
elected to facilitate “the successful execution of existing efforts and the 
scaling-up and introduction of new or strengthened voluntary efforts, ini-
tiatives and coalitions.” They encouraged nonparty stakeholders to register 
their actions in the Non-State Actor Zone on Climate Action (NAZCA), a 
data platform launched in conjunction with COP 20 in Lima in 2014. And 
finally, governments decided to convene a high-level event pursuing the 
Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA), also launched at COP 20, which gave 
nonstate actors, including multistakeholder climate coalitions, much atten-
tion. In the wake of COP 21, several processes (e.g., the Marrakech Part-
nership for Global Climate Action and the Talanoa Dialogue) have been 
started to further highlight climate action by nonparty stakeholders and 
cooperative initiatives. The processes in the UNFCCC aiming to integrate 
private and hybrid governance initiatives with the existing public regime 
has also spurred regional and national offsprings. In Sweden and Argentina 
for instance, governments and civil society groups are launching new ini-
tiatives to bring nonstate and subnational climate initiatives closer to the 
national decision-making processes (Chan, Ellinger, and Widerberg 2018). 
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In sum, events at both the international, transnational, and national level 
suggest that cooperative initiatives are gaining further traction as an instru-
ment of choice for addressing climate change.
To what extent are cooperative initiatives having concrete impacts? It 
is true that a large number and wide variety of cooperative initiatives have 
been observed and documented in both academic and policy circles (Wider-
berg, Pattberg, and Kristensen 2016; Bulkeley et al. 2014). For example, the 
UNEP Climate Initiative Platform contains 222 initiatives to date and the 
UNFCCC platform NAZCA, established in 2014, showcases 77 cooperative 
initiatives. Many initiatives engage in actions which, in theory, increase 
transparency and processes such as creating new standards, recording infor-
mation on actions and commitments, and publishing progress reports to 
decision-makers and the general public (Bulkeley et al. 2014; Green 2013). 
They also generate a baffling amount of data, studies, and reports. The CDP, 
for instance, records data from over 5,000 companies on climate change, 
forests, water, and supply chains. The carbonn Climate Registry provides a 
platform for local and subnational governments to report on climate tar-
gets and GHG emissions, collecting data from over 600 cities and local gov-
ernments in more than 60 countries. In theory, cooperative initiatives are 
thus ameliorating the conditions for holding actors accountable for their 
activities that have an impact on climate change. By publishing climate 
commitments of a city or company, for instance, as well as continuously 
monitoring and reporting on performance, cooperative initiatives provide 
material for holding actors accountable for their actions. Despite all these 
cooperative initiatives, however, global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
keep increasing at a relentless speed, resulting in unprecedented levels of 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere (IPCC 2014). So while the possibilities 
for holding those governing climate change to account have multiplied, 
the impact on GHG emissions appears nonexistent. This is what Kramarz 
and Park call the accountability trap, in which the number of processes for 
accountability increase alongside the “continued deterioration of the envi-
ronment” (see chapter 1, in this volume). What explains the accountability 
trap when it comes to climate change? Kramarz and Park develop a two-tier 
model, focusing on the design of institutions and execution of interven-
tions. Central to their model is the notion that actors have different goals 
when entering an initiative, as well as different responsibilities and target 
audiences. For example, a liberal democracy is answerable to its electorate 
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for delivering a public good, a firm to its shareholders to generate return on 
investments, and a civil society organization (CSO) to uphold moral stan-
dards to its followers (see chapter 1, in this volume).
For studying accountability, several analyses have used the concept of 
“accountability regimes” (Mashaw 2006; Chan and Pattberg 2008). Differ-
ent accountability regimes can be distinguished through “ideal types” of 
governance systems that can be divided into public, private, social, or varia-
tions thereof (Chan and Pattberg 2008; Mashaw 2006; chapter 1, in this 
volume). Public actors answer to their citizens through “public account-
ability regimes” that are hierarchically arranged where “obligations flow 
up and down hierarchies” (Chan and Pattberg 2008, 105). Private and non-
governmental institutions are linked through “market-based accountability 
regimes” that are organized around market principles (Mashaw 2006, 122). 
The third broad category of ideal types are “social accountability regimes” 
that encompass a wide variety of accountability relationships, from family 
ties to club membership (Chan and Pattberg 2008, 105). The ideal types 
and accountability regimes in turn correspond to three actor types: public 
authorities, firms, and civil society. In public systems, the goal is to pro-
vide a public good and to be answerable to an electorate or other politi-
cal communities; private systems concern economic benefits to consumers 
and shareholders; and voluntary systems concern commonly “agreed upon 
moral standards of conduct among self-selected, like-minded individuals” 
(chapter 1, in this volume). Consequently, different logics lead to different 
accountability standards, processes, and sanctioning opportunities.
Hybrid cooperative initiatives blur the distinction between public and 
private institutions. For instance, one of the case studies in this chapter, 
the Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials (RSB) standard, is developed 
under the auspices of members from the entire supply chain of biomateri-
als, as well as representatives from diverse groups, such as environmental 
NGOs (ENGOs), trade unions, and researchers. Bäckstrand (2008, 80) con-
tends that in these cases of networked partnerships, the most applicable 
types of accountability mechanisms are nonhierarchical and horizontal. 
These accountability mechanisms are characterized by reputational account-
ability, requiring functioning monitoring mechanisms; market accountabil-
ity, providing signals for rewards or punishment; and peer accountability, 
allowing peers to monitor and assess each other. Bäckstrand further sug-
gests that cooperative initiatives should be accountable to many different 
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actors, state and nonstate, since networked governance arrangements are 
“neither directly accountable to an electoral base nor do they exhibit clear 
principal agent relationships” (Benner et al. in Bäckstrand 2008, 82). Bäck-
strand, Kramarz, and Park’s writings suggest that governance structures 
characterized by multiple types of actors and networked, horizontal gover-
nance modes require us to “unpack” the principal-agent conceptualization 
of accountability (Bäckstrand 2008, 80). This chapter empirically unpacks 
the accountability relationship between public and private actors engaged 
in cooperative initiatives using Kramarz and Park’s (Kramarz and Park 2016; 
see also introductory chapter) second-tier accountability concept, explor-
ing the processes, standards, sanctions, and impacts of accountability. The 
following section explains the case selection and research approach.
Case Study Selection
Research on cooperative initiatives in global climate governance has 
increased rapidly, also from an accountability perspective (Widerberg and 
Pattberg 2017). By creating databases, academics and international organi-
zations are mapping the field of cooperative initiatives in a systematic way 
(see Widerberg and Stripple 2016 for an overview). NAZCA and the Climate 
Initiatives Platform for instance, are leveraging the data-gathering efforts 
by organizations such as CDP and the Covenant of Mayors that focus on 
specific types of actors such as companies and subnational authorities. 
Consequently, our understanding of how the landscape of cooperative ini-
tiatives is structured has improved tremendously. An interesting observa-
tion emerging from the data is that cooperative initiatives often engage 
directly in creating accountability mechanisms such as standard setting, 
monitoring, reporting, and publishing. For instance, over 40 percent of the 
eighty-nine cooperative initiatives collected in the CONNECT project have 
a “standards and commitments” function, meaning that they require their 
members to follow certain standards of behavior (e.g., carbon accounting 
standards) or commit to climate actions (e.g., by publicly stating a carbon 
reduction target).
This chapter uses a case study approach to investigate what processes 
and standards initiatives have in place to ensure measures are taken and 
progress evaluated; what sanctions are used for dealing with misconduct 
and failure to live up to commitments; and what impacts can be attributed 
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to the initiatives. Case studies allow for going beyond just observing that 
cooperative initiatives engage in activities related to accountability, and 
toward exploring how they do so (Yin 2014). To select cases, the chapter 
starts with a data set of eighty-nine cooperative initiatives gathered in the 
CONNECT project (Widerberg, Pattberg, and Kristensen 2016). The coop-
erative initiatives included in the data-set are (1) international and trans-
national institutions, (2) who not only have the intentionality to steer the 
policy and behavior of their members or a broader community, (3) but also 
explicitly mention a common governance goal (4) accomplishable by sig-
nificant governance functions (Widerberg, Pattberg, and Kristensen 2016). 
For each cooperative initiative, the data-set includes information on focus 
area (e.g., urban climate action, climate finance, or energy efficiency), num-
ber of members, year of initiations, and various other descriptive statistics. 
Furthermore, the institutions have been visually mapped using a concep-
tual model called a “governance triangle,” designed by Abbott and Snidal 
(2009a, 2009b; Abbott 2012). The triangle is divided into seven zones. Zones 
1, 2, and 3 comprise institutions with only public, firm, or CSO members. 
Zones 4, 5, and 6 contain hybrid constellations between two of the three 
types of actors. Zone 7 contains multistakeholder institutions, where all 
three types of actors collaborate. Each cooperative initiative is thus situated 
in the governance triangle depending on its constituent members (public, 
firm, or CSO). Further, the cooperative initiatives are color coded according 
to their primary functions, including the following: standard and commit-
ments, operational, information and networking, or financing. Figure 5.1 
shows the CONNECT project’s version of the climate governance triangle 
(which is an updated and slightly tweaked version of Abbott, 2012).
This chapter focuses on multistakeholder institutions situated in zone 
7, since the primary interest of this chapter is accountability in hybrid 
constellations where public and private actors cooperate. Moreover, it is 
reasonable to argue that some cooperative initiatives perform functions 
that are more relevant for accountability than others. Cooperative initia-
tives setting up standards and commitments are directly aiming to pro-
vide instruments and data which in theory enable holding an organization 
accountable, or at least monitoring its actions. An institution focusing on 
information and networking may be less interesting from an accountability 
perspective since it, in theory, does not suggest an accountability relation-
ship between the members of the institution or to an external constituency. 
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The case selection is therefore limited to cooperative initiatives located in 
zone 7 in the governance triangle and that have standards and commit-
ments as primary functions. Four cases fit these criteria: Lean and Green 
(L&G); Compact of States and Regions (CSR); UNEP Financial Initiative’s 
Portfolio Decarbonization Coalition (UNEP FI PDC); and the RSB. Due to 
practical reasons of data gathering, the Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) 
initiative has been excluded from the study.
Table 5.1 presents the initiatives selected for case studies. All initiatives 
involve standards and commitments and engage public, CSO, and firm 
actors in a hybrid form of collaboration. The members are those actors 
that are formally able to exert influence on the rules, norms, operations, or 
performance of the initiative, and solely concern organizations (not indi-
viduals). The table includes the initiative’s name, acronym, starting date, 
Figure 5.1
Climate governance triangle (published in Widerberg, Pattberg, and Kristensen 2016 
and Widerberg and Pattberg 2016, based on Abbott and Snidal, 2009a and b; Abbott, 
2012).
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number of members2, number of participants, target group or sector, and a 
short description of main goals.
The table shows the wide variance across the cases in terms of starting 
year, number of members, target group, and types of goals. In the following 
sections, each case is described in more detail:
Lean and Green (L&G) is a transnational cooperative initiative targeting 
GHG emissions in the transport sector. Started in 2008 by the Dutch-based 
network Conneckt, it is now active in five countries across three transport 
sectors: logistics, personal mobility, and inland container shipping. The 
participating companies and organizations commit to lowering their car-
bon dioxide (CO2) emissions by 20 percent in five years. If the target is 
reached, the company could win the L&G award and becomes eligible for a 
L&G star, a certification for climate action. The award functions as an indi-
cator for the front-runners in the program, and thus in theory incentivizes 
other companies to increase their ambitions. The certifications can be used 
for public relation purposes and are, for instance, portrayed on the trucks 
of the companies involved in the initiative.
The Compact of States and Regions (CSR) is a cooperative initiative estab-
lished in September 2014 at the New York Climate Summit that engages 
subnational governments in providing data on their GHG emissions. CSR 
is a partnership between five large nonprofit organizations, including the 
Climate Group, CDP, Regions of Climate Action (R20), and Network of 
Regional Governments for Sustainable Development (nrg4SD). Also, Local 
Governments for Sustainability (ICLEI, formerly the International Council 
for Local Environmental Initiatives), the world’s largest initiative for cit-
ies and subnational governments, is a supporting partner and provides the 
carbonn Climate Registry (cCR), which is used as the CSR’s reporting plat-
form. The main aim of the CSR is to gather data, report, and assess the 
progress made toward their emission reduction commitments. Despite its 
recent start, the CSR already collects emissions and commitment data from 
nearly forty-four subnational governments. Its first aggregate report was 
released and presented at the COP 21 in Paris.
The United Nations Environmental Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP FI) is a 
partnership between UNEP and the global finance sector which started in 
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2003. With nearly 220 members, the initiative focuses on climate finance. 
Under UNEP FI, the PDC started in 2014 aimed at investors, specifically 
asset owners and asset managers (UNEP FI 2016a). A key goal for the initia-
tive is to make a carbon footprint measurement and for periodical disclo-
sure to become common practice for investors (UNEP FI 2016a). Currently, 
the PDC brings together twenty-five investors managing $3.2 trillion in 
assets, of which decarbonization commitments represent $600 billion 
(UNEP FI 2016b).
The Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials (RSB) is a cooperative initiative 
which started in 2007, targeting emissions in the biomaterials industry. 
The industry includes companies engaged in using materials derived from 
plants or manure, which can be converted and used as an energy source. 
The RSB gathers stakeholders from all parts of the value chain in the bioma-
terials industry, as well as civil society (trade unions and rights-based NGOs; 
social development NGOs; ENGOs), public actors (government, multilateral 
organizations), and academia. The key instrument is a certification scheme 
which is provided to companies and organizations producing biomaterials 
that are sustainable, ethical, and credibly sourced.
For each cooperative initiative, four questions are addressed (also see 
chapter 1, in this volume):
1. What processes demonstrate accountability?
2. What standards demonstrate accountability?
3. What sanctions are available when there is failure to meet those 
standards?
4. What impacts do the accountability practices have on reshaping the 
goals of parties involved in governing the global environment?
Three types of data were collected. First, academic literature and research 
reports provide a theoretical and practical understanding of hybrid coop-
erative initiatives in the wider context of environmental and climate gov-
ernance. Second, home pages and reports by the cooperative initiatives 
themselves were used. Third, semistructured interviews with 12 representa-
tives from the initiatives themselves, as well as organizations participating 
in the initiatives, were carried out via telephone or Skype in June and July 
2016 (see table 5.2). The next section presents and discusses the results of 
the case studies.
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Results: Accountability Processes, Standards, Sanctions, and Impacts in 
Four Cooperative Initiatives
This section discusses “means of accountability,” including processes, stan-
dards, and sanctions, as well as impacts, across four cooperative initiatives.
Processes
Accountability processes, meaning “through what processes accountability 
is to be assured” (Mashaw 2006, 118), are likely to be structured differ-
ently depending on the constellation of actors. An initiative comprising 
governments and democratically elected officials, for instance, may face 
other transparency and procedural demands than a voluntary initiative 
between companies. Levels of inclusiveness, disclosure, and publicity are 
likely to differ in public, private, or hybrid settings. For instance, in public 
governance institutions, accountability processes could mean transparency 
and public access to data such as budget reviews; in private governance 
institutions, this could be financial disclosure, auditing reports, following 
business praxis; and in voluntary initiatives, it could be norm dissemina-
tion, lobbying, and information campaigns (see chapter 1, in this volume). 
In hybrid initiatives, such as those studied in this chapter, it is interesting 
to examine what accountability processes gain footholds in each initiative.
The accountability processes differ quite substantially across the four 
cases in terms of levels of detail and rigor. The RSB is perhaps the most 
advanced in this respect. If a company is to receive an RSB certificate it 
needs to follow a procedure of application and prepare and be subjected to 
an audit. Different types of companies, be they smallholders or large scale 
biomass producers, can choose between different certifications. After noti-
fying the RSB, receiving an approval, and contacting a third-party auditor 
accredited by the RSB, companies have to prepare for an audit by working 
their way through an extensive checklist using tools provided by the RSB. 
If the auditor considers the company ready, it receives the certification. 
Depending on their risk level, RSB participants are periodically evaluated 
(every year or every two years) depending on their risk score (Roundtable 
on Sustainable Biomaterials, 2017). L&G also provides a certification and 
an award. Organizations are expected to provide a plan of action, which is 
evaluated by a third-party auditor (TNO 2015). The plan receives a grade 
arranged on a three-point scale (green, orange, or red) depending on its 
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quality. Red indicates that the entire plan must be rewritten, something 
which is allowed up to three times. If the plan is given a green grade, the 
L&G award is given. If the plan is not approved, it gets an orange grade for 
improvement, or if it needs to be redone entirely, it gets a red grade. The 
company then has five years to execute the plan; if they are successful, they 
receive an L&G star, which corresponds to a certificate. A second star can be 
obtained through an enhanced plan with more elaborate CO2 monitoring 
(Connekt 2017).
In contrast to RSB and L&G, accountability is demonstrated in the CSR 
and the PDC by information disclosure. Commitments and progress made 
are published annually in the CSR disclosure reports, providing detailed 
information on the goals and actions by cities and regions. Similarly, the 
PDC relies on the commitments their participants make and their decar-
bonization strategies in the annual report of the Portfolio (UNEP FI and 
CDP 2015).
A distinction regarding accountability processes can thus be made 
between the RSB and the L&G, which have certification-based proc-
esses, and the CSR and PDC, which have disclosure-based processes. 
Certification-based approaches have different accountability process logics 
than disclosure-based approaches. The certification-based approaches have 
detailed safeguards ensuring that their target companies comply with cer-
tain standards. In particular, the third-party verification system is a pow-
erful tool for distancing the cooperative initiative itself from the actual 
process of accountability (see chapter 3, in this volume). For disclosure-
based approaches, such as in CSR and PDC, the key to change is disclosing 
information about the behaviors and accomplishments of the participating 
actors to a third party, for instance, the public (Mitchell 2011).
Standards
Standards for accountability refers to the yardstick by which agents are held 
to account. In climate governance, an impact-level yardstick would be GHG 
emissions; however, few cooperative initiatives are collecting such data, or 
engage in governance mechanisms that only indirectly are expected to 
reduce emissions (Widerberg and Stripple, 2016). Hence, beyond direct 
GHG emissions reductions, for public governance institutions, standards 
for accountability could be legislation, policy instruments, or monitoring. 
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For private governance institutions, it could be prices, environmental, 
social, or other governance standards and benchmarks, and availability 
of products. Finally, for voluntary initiatives, it could be the uptake of a 
certain norm by the target group (chapter 1, in this volume). In hybrid 
initiatives, not all these standards are available to the group as a whole. For 
instance, a company cannot always be held accountable by the same yard-
stick as a subnational government.
Across the four cases, the certification-based cooperative initiatives dif-
fer distinctively from the disclosure-based approaches when it comes to 
standards. The certification-based approaches both have highly developed 
and detailed standards for which to hold the organizations in question to 
account. The RSB employs specific standards that are based on 12 prin-
ciples going beyond GHG emissions, including the following: legality—the 
laws and regulations that apply are adhered to; human and labor rights—
these rights are not violated and decent work and workers’ wellbeing is 
being promoted; and land rights—respecting traditional land rights of 
local and indigenous communities. GHG emissions should be significantly 
reduced compared to fossil fuel use. Counted across the whole life cycle, 
the RSB requires 50 percent lower life-cycle GHG emissions than a fossil 
fuel baseline. L&G also have detailed standards for assessment; however, 
the focus is entirely on reduction of CO2 emissions. The level of detail 
in the plans submitted by the companies is key to receiving a favorable 
recommendation from the auditor. Organizations aiming for the first 
L&G star have to adhere to the standard of a minimum greenhouse gas 
emissions reduction of 20 percent, to be achieved within a maximum of 
five years.
On the other hand, the disclosure-based cooperative initiatives have far 
less rigid systems and standards for accountability. The CSR expects partici-
pants to report a public commitment to reduce their greenhouse gas emis-
sions to the Compact with regionwide inventory data on an annual basis. 
There are no requirements as to the level of ambition of targets or progress 
toward those targets. Asset owners and managers taking part in the PDC 
are requested to have made a climate-related disclosure pledge, decide on a 
decarbonization strategy, and to submit a timeframe and percentage of the 
assets managed. Furthermore, the PDC requires a board-level commitment 
to the initiative.
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Sanctions
Sanctions for accountability refers to what happens in cases of noncompli-
ance, i.e., when a partner in a cooperative initiative fails to live up to its 
commitments or the spirit of the cooperation. While a public actor can be 
punished by an electorate (at least in liberal democracies), companies can 
be punished by stock markets or consumers, and CSOs can lose reputa-
tion or members, it is less clear what the stakes are for partners in hybrid 
cooperative initiatives. The sanctions have to either be streamlined, find-
ing a common denominator for all types of partners, or differentiated, 
where each type of partner is treated with a different sanction in case of 
noncompliance.
For the certification-based cooperative initiatives, the most severe sanc-
tions for not complying with the standards are straightforward: namely, 
the loss of the certificate. If a participant to the RSB does not live up to the 
criteria at an audit, violations are categorized as major, which need to be 
resolved quickly, or minor, for which there is more time to resolve them 
(RSB 2016). If infractions are not resolved, the RSB certificate of an orga-
nization is suspended and their publication on the RSB website removed 
until a future audit proves satisfactory. The RSB suspends organizations that 
demonstrate severe noncompliance at an audit, as well as organizations 
that demonstrate a smaller noncompliance but do not repair the infraction 
within a given time frame (dependent on the infraction). The suspension is 
withdrawn only when every noncompliance is closed. The audit reports are 
published, all certified organizations are published, and the RSB certificate 
is withdrawn if an organization is noncompliant.
L&G has a similar sanction of companies. In the worst-case scenario of 
noncompliance, they are forced to stop using the certificate. In L&G, if a 
plan of action is not approved, the organization does not receive the L&G 
award or second star but has to revise and resubmit the plan. There is no 
procedure in case a plan of action is not approved at the third submission 
because, as one respondent put it: “If a plan of action is orange [up for 
revision], I have never encountered a situation in which it is not green 
[approved] at the third attempt. Or the party really is not trying, but there’s 
money involved, so parties really do their best to get their plan of action 
green.” (Interview R9).
The rules, however, appear to be applied quite strictly. If, for the attain-
ment of the first star, an organization does not achieve the 20 percent 
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reduction of greenhouse gas emissions within a period of five years, the 
star is not granted. The organization consequently has the possibility 
to start anew, or to leave the initiative. In the hypothetical case that an 
organization decides to leave L&G, it is not allowed to use their logo and 
promotional material anymore, whether on the their website or in other 
communications.
For the disclosure-based cooperative initiatives, exclusion is the heaviest 
sanction available. In the CSR, if a previously participating state or region 
does not disclose their regionwide greenhouse gas inventory data, it will 
be excluded from the disclosure report. There are no sanctions from the 
initiative regarding the (lack of) progress that states and regions make, or 
whether or not they achieve the targets they have committed to. The PDC 
has yet to encounter a situation in which a participant fails to live up to 
their reporting obligation, and it would be up to the steering committee to 
determine what would happen if, after repeatedly asking the asset manager 
or owner to report, they did not comply (Interview R12). The initiative does 
not apply any sanctions regarding the attaining of targets, as one respon-
dent stated: “We’re not going to punish or exclude a member for being 
unsuccessful” (Interview R12). This demonstrates that the PDC values the 
appearance of commitment to their goals more than the actual achieve-
ment of results.
Beyond being excluded from an initiative, reputational damage is a 
central sanctioning mechanism in all four cases. Being in noncompliance 
with an initiative’s goals or the self-stated commitments (for example, on a 
homepage), could have a series of (hypothetical) effects. For market actors, 
reputational damage could lead to a decrease in business opportunities 
as individual consumers, public authorities (through procurement guide-
lines), and companies are increasingly factoring sustainability into their 
purchasing decisions. For disclosure-based initiatives, the public response 
is an important ingredient for effectiveness. A member to the CSR argued, 
“What we do is we make available that data, in a very nice way, in Eng-
lish, and we produce disclosure reports. And then it’s up to other organiza-
tions or up to academics, media, citizens, civil society, to hold their states 
accountable.” (Interview R1). As Mitchell (2011) argues, transparency is 
most influential on behavior when it is linked to social sanctions, such as 
public outrage when environmentally harmful behaviors become known. 
Changing social norms could also have positive effects, as a respondent 
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from a subnational authority in Canada argued, “We’re looking at our com-
petitors, economically and geographically and otherwise, and no one wants 
to be the laggard, no one wants to be doing nothing while everyone else is 
doing something. It becomes, by doing benchmarking like this, it almost 
sets it up to become a race for the top, rather than a race to the bottom. You 
want to be a leader.” (Interview R2). The PDC counts on a combined public 
and private sanctioning mechanism where consumers and other societal 
actors punish a company through reputational damage (e.g., loss in busi-
ness opportunities) but also engage shareholders in the company’s behav-
ior. The level of publicity a company gains from joining or committing to 
a cooperative initiative is thus a double-edged sword. As one interviewee 
from PDC argues,
Because it’s becoming so high level, organizations know that people are going to be 
watching them. A lot of institutions that have made a commitment have actually 
announced it with a lot of fanfare…And none of these institutions have made their 
announcement until they had outlined their strategy and put the strategy in place. 
Because they know that they are going to be held accountable to those commit-
ments. So, to be honest, I actually don’t think the scenario will exist [in which the 
actors do not make good on their commitments], just because the commitments are 
made at such as a high level. No one wants to look like they have failed. Or that they 
haven’t come through on those commitments. (Interview R12).
This suggests that actors participating in one of the hybrid voluntary 
initiatives are unlikely to be sanctioned, since they usually join when 
they already have a plan and know they will succeed, and are furthermore 
apprehensive of reputational damage. On the other hand, the initiatives 
are unlikely to apply serious sanctions to participants failing to meet their 
criteria, as they strive to preserve them as members and retain or regain 
their commitment.
Impacts
The final, and for many observers the most important, aspect of coopera-
tive initiatives, is whether any tangible impacts can be attributed to the ini-
tiative. Also called output accountability, this type of accountability focuses 
on whether the cooperative initiative has reached its goals and can account 
for its impacts (see chapter 1, in this volume). On the whole, there is little 
data on the ex post effects of cooperative initiatives (Widerberg and Stripple 
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2016). It is also important to note that most cooperative initiatives are not 
envisaging direct environmental impacts from their actions, but rather 
focus on indirect impacts such as reduced energy intensity or uptake of 
renewables, or even more indirect indicators such as disclosure levels or 
reporting to a data repository. In some cases, there is no clear causal link 
between successful implementation of accountability procedures and stan-
dards, and environmental impacts.
Evaluation research in general is quite skeptical about the capability of 
drawing straight causal lines between an environmental institution and 
effects on the environment, due to the many confounding factors influ-
encing the causal chain (Miles et al. 2001). Yet, Kramarz and Park rightly 
notice that despite the many accountability mechanisms in place, there 
seems to be no significant effect on the environment as a whole. However, 
this does not mean that individual progress has not been made. In the four 
cases analyzed in this chapter, tangible effects are found: holders of the 
first L&G star have reduced their emissions by a minimum of 20 percent 
compared to their base measurement, and some have widely exceeded this 
target. For example, Moonen Packaging reduced its GHG emissions by 50 
percent. Actors from the initiatives hope that through their arrangement, 
the participating institutions are held accountable, and this will result 
in significant impacts. While the CSR requires participating subnational 
governments to set targets and report on progress, the relatively nascent 
start of the initiative makes is difficult to assess progress. Furthermore, it 
may in any case prove difficult to attribute any emission reductions to the 
Compact directly. This also applies, to some extent, to results achieved by 
members of L&G and the PDC. Several factors are at work for these actors, 
legislation increasingly comes into play, and it remains to be investigated 
how public pressure and market demands would have affected the actors 
without being channeled by the initiatives.
In the end, there are clear cases when private actors have been punished 
for not abiding by the spirit of cooperative initiatives. Consider, for exam-
ple, the case of Shell, a fossil fuel company, who were forced to leave the 
influential climate lobby group Prince of Wales Corporate Leaders Group 
(CLG) amid concerns over its strategy to drill for oil in the Arctic, which 
went against the spirit and goals of the CLG (Stacey 2015). Similarly, Volk-
swagen’s cheating on emissions tests on about 11 million diesel cars and 
the ensuing legal actions saw its stock price plummet (at least temporarily) 
Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/books/book/chapter-pdf/244922/9780262351874_cbi.pdf by VU Amsterdam user on 03 May 2021
140 Oscar Widerberg, Philipp Pattberg, and Lieke Brouwer
from a year high of roughly 253 euros in April 2015 to 92 euros in October 
2015, equal to a drop of 63 percent (Google Finance). Moreover, processes 
for accountability are external to the procedures of the cooperative ini-
tiative. For example, in 2015, when Volkswagen’s large-scale cheating on 
emissions tests was revealed, the company’s four climate pledges on the 
NAZCA platform were duly removed.
Conclusions
Climate change governance is an issue area haunted by the accountabil-
ity trap, where processes and standards for holding stakeholders account-
able proliferate without any visible reduction in the total amount of GHG 
emissions. This chapter focuses on second-tier accountability, studying the 
processes, standards, sanctions, and impacts in four cases of multistake-
holder cooperative initiatives engaged in climate action. One can make a 
distinction between the RSB and the L&G, which are certification-based 
initiatives, and the CSR and PDC, which are disclosure-based initiatives. 
The cases show how the “logics of action” (see chapter 1, in this volume) in 
the initiatives revolve around the use of common standards and reporting 
formats. Certification-based initiatives, in particular the RSB, have a more 
rigorous process and detailed standards in place than the disclosure-based 
initiatives; for instance, the certification-based initiatives require third-
party verification for the certificates.
At the impact level, there is some (self-reported) evidence that the orga-
nizations that are part of cooperative initiatives are changing their behav-
ior. For instance, some transport companies in the L&G initiative have 
reduced their GHG emissions substantially. Tying the reductions to the 
influence of the cooperative initiative, however, remains a methodologi-
cal challenge for the future. Moreover, none of the four initiatives have 
sanctioning mechanisms in place, beyond withdrawing memberships, cer-
tifications, or the right to use logos for branding. It is also unclear to what 
extent such sanctioning mechanisms have been used and what their effects 
have been. In sum, this chapter is congruent with the description of the 
“accountability trap” in the introductory chapter of this volume by sug-
gesting that while parts of second-tier accountability (primarily processes, 
standards, and sanctions) can be described in detail, it remains difficult to 
link the outputs of the various initiatives to their environmental outcomes. 
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In the context of accountability, more research on sanctions and their vari-
ous effects on actors in cooperative initiatives would be particularly useful 
to better understand to what extent they play a role in accountability as a 
“regulative mean.”
Notes
1. Coping with Fragmentation: Assessing and Reforming the Current Architecture 
of Global Environmental Governance, http://fragmentation.eu.
2. Members refers to those actors with governing capacity, i.e., rulemaking functions 
in the cooperative initiatives. Participants are those actors that are rule takers.
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